The McEliece cryptosystem based on quasi-cyclic moderatedensity parity-check (QC-MDPC) codes is first purposed in 2013[1] and is considered a promising contender in the post-quantum era. Understanding its security is hence essential. Till now, the most effective attacks are the reaction attack[2] and the timing attack [3] . Both of these attacks rely on the decoding performance to recover the private key. The reaction attack relies on the decoding failure rate and the timing attack relies on the iterations during decoding. However, the mechanics behind these attacks remain elusive. In this paper, a mathematical model is proposed to explain both attacks by connecting the spectrum of private key and first-layer performance of the decoder.
Introduction
Code-based cryptography is first proposed in 1978 by McEliece [4] . In the original scheme, McEliece exploits Goppa code to store and protect data. The original scheme remains unbroken in the last forty years and becomes one of the most promising crypto-systems that can survive under quantum attacks. However, the original scheme suffers from a large key size. The public key size is the modified generator matrix of the Goppa code we use. Thus, to transfer a length k message, we will need a public key size k × n.
In 2013, a new variant of the McEliece system based on QC-MDPC(quasicyclic moderate-density-parity-check code) was proposed [1] . This scheme exploits QC-MDPC code, instead of Goppa code, to store data. The quasi-cyclic property can considerably shorten public key size for a given security level, from O(n×k) to O(n). Moreover, the MDPC property makes this code an inferior version of the LDPC code. Therefore, decoding algorithms of LDPC code, usually the Gallagher algorithm, can be directly applied to the QC-MDPC code.
However, this new scheme brings new security flaws. In 2016, Guo Qian [2] proposed a reaction attack on this scheme. In 2018, Edward Eaton proposed a timing attack [3] . Both attacks are based on the feedback of the decoding performance during decryption: Reaction attack is based on failure feedback and timing attack is based on the number of iterations during decoding through a side-channel attack. By collecting a large number of data about the decoding performance, we are able to recover the private key with a large probability.
The key idea of the Reaction attack [2] and Timing attack [3] is that the private key can be efficiently recovered from the spectrum of the private key. Moreover, we find that the reaction performance and timing performance are influenced by the "overlap" between the spectrum of the private key and the spectrum of error. Then, with the knowledge of performance and error, we can recover the spectrum of the private key and, thus the private key.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we analyze the mechanics behind the two attacks, especially the timing attack. We at first explain why the two attacks work from a coding theory perspective. Then, a mathematical framework of these two attacks is built that can help us understand or estimate the speed of similar attacks.
In sections 3 and 4, we explain why the "overlap" between the spectrum of the private key and the spectrum of error can make difference to the performance of the decoder through connecting the overlapping spectrum to the first layer performance in the decoder. Moreover, we build a series of linear models to describe the relationship numerically.
In section 5, we build a math model to explain how to apply the conclusion in section 3 or 4 to design an attack on the QC-MDPC code crypto-system. Also, this model can help to estimate the speed of such attack.
QC-MDPC McEliece System and Attacks
This section will introduce some basic knowledge. Subsection one will focus on the QC-MDPC code, its decoding algorithm, and application to McEliece system. Subsection two will introduce the reaction attack and timing attack on QC-MDPC crypto-system.
QC-MDPC Crypto-system
The QC-MDPC PQC is defined by four parameters [n, k, ω, t], which represents a class of QC-MDPC codes. The encryption/decryption of QC-MDPC PQC is based on the encoding/decoding process of this code.
Code Generation The first stage is to generate a QC-MDPC code with the given parameters. In most practical cases, we assume n = 2k. The process is as following: QC-MDPC Crypto-system encryption and decryption Bob wants to communicate with Alice with the QC-MDPC cypto-system. He will first generate the a [n, k, ω, t] code (G, H) based on the above method. Then, he will publicly announce [n, k, t] and G. Alice will divide her messages into k-bit pieces m. The encryption process is:
-Generate an error vector e ∈ F n 2 with exactly t non-zero term.
Then, when Bob received the ciphertext, he will process the decryption process:
-Call the decoder of this QC-MDPC code, D H on ciphertext c. The decoder will return an unpolluted code-word c or a symbol of decoding failure. -If the decoding succeeds, Bob can recover the message m simply by cutting the first k-bits of c . -If the decoding failure, Bob may require a re-transmission or process other functions.
The decoder may succeed but return an wrong message to Bob. QC-MDPC code can reduce the probability of returning wrong message by lowering the value of ω and t. However, lowering ω and t will reduce the security of this cryptosystem at the same time. We need a trade-off between the performance of codes and performance of cryto-system. The purposed parameters for different security level [1] : Decoding algorithm for QC-MDPC code The QC-MDPC code has a similar structure to the LDPC(low-density-parity-check) code. Therefore, we can adopt the decoding algorithm of LDPC codes. The most widely-used algorithm for decoding LDPC codes is the bit-fliping algorithm. This algorithm will require a vector of threshold b ∈ Z n and the parity-check matrix H. This algorithm is an iterative algorithm. In each iteration, the algorithm first computes the syndrome(parity nodes) of the codeword, s = H * c in F 2 field. Then, the algorithm will give each bit a "score" based on s and flip all bits whose score is large than the threshold. If the syndrome s becomes all zeros before the max turn, the decoding is successful; Otherwise, the decoding fails. The pseudo-code for this algorithms is at Appendix A.
Timing attack for QC-MDPC systems
The parity-check matrix H can be fully constructed from its first row h = [h 0 |h 1 ]. Moreover, with the knowledge of generator matrix G, attackers can recover h 1 from h 0 . So, an attack on h 0 is sufficient to break this system.
At first, I introduce the concept of the distance spectrum of vectors on F 2 .
Distance between two nonzero term and Distance spectrum of a vector
By Guo's paper [2] , we have an efficient algorithm to recover the secrete key h 0 from its spectrum ∆(h 0 ). A timing attack will recover the spectrum of h 0 by estimating the average iterations needed to decode codewords of a certain type. The detailed timing attack algorithm is shown in Appendix A.
This algorithm will return a ratio iteration i /observed i , which converges to E[iteration|∆(e) i = 0]. The timing attack is totally based on an observation that This E[iteration|∆(e) i = 0] has a negative relationship with the spectrum of secret key ∆(h 0 ) i . In the next two section, I will use a linear model to describe this relationship and analyze how this result leads us to a successful attack.
Causal Relation between the Error and the First-layer Performance
The timing attack relies on the different performance of the decoder to reveal the secrete key. Therefore, an understanding of how the decoder reacts to the different errors can help us analyze the attack. To formulate the problem, consider a QC-MDPC code with the parity-check matrix
are cyclic. I denote the h 0 , h 1 the first rows of H 0 , H 1 and ω 0 , ω 1 the weight of h 0 and h 1 . In practice, ω 0 should be close to ω 1 . Otherwise, this code will be too bad to use. An error e = [e 0 |e 1 ] with weight t is sent to the decoder of this code.
I define θ a measure of "overlaping level" between the spectrum of h 0 and the spectrum of e.
To characterize the first-layer performance of the decoding of error e, I count two quantities: ErrGen and ErrCrt. ErrGen is the number of error-less bits that mistakenly flipped in the first iteration, and ErrCrt is the number of erroneous bits that successfully corrected in the first layer. I will show how these two quantity react to θ and influence the final performance of the decoder.
From Error to ErrCrt
In the first layer, the decoder will flip all the bits connecting to more than the threshold number of unsatisfied parity-check nodes(the score of this bit). So, ErrCrt is largely determined by the distribution of score of erroneous bits, especially the expectation. The relationship between θ and ErrCrt can be derived from the relation between θ and the expectation of score of an erroneous bit, Score 1 .
I assume a linear model between θ and Score 1 :
In practice, we do not care much about the value of b. The value of is generally estimated in experiment. The value of β represents the strength of relation and can be approximate in the following way.
Without any information on errors. Error occurs with uniform probability on the first half part of codeword. So: The notation 1 j i means the indicator function for event that bit node i sits on position j of a parity node s, and this s equals 1.
Event A: Given that spectrum of error share a distance d with the spectrum of h 0 . That's, for a distance d such that ∆(h 0 ) d = 0, we know that ∆(e) d also increase 1. Let {a i }, i ≤ ω 0 be the index of non-zero term of h 0 . Without loss of generality, we assume that a 2 − a 1 = d.
Then, we can compute this expectation by elaborating 1 t t i=1 E[1 j ai ] for different j.This expectation can be calculated under two cases.
-Case1: j = 1 or j = 2:We already know the distance between position 1 and 2 matches the distance between a 1 and a 2 . So, if a 1 fall in position 1 or a 2 fall in position 2 (each with probability 1 t ), we immediately know a 2 fall in position 2 or a 1 fall in position 1, respectively. Therefore, the event 1 1 a1 and event 1 2 a2 is equivalent to that randomly chooses ω 0 − 2 from k − t zeros and t − 2 ones without replacement, and gets odd number of ones. By symmetry, the distribution for j = 1 or j = 2 is identical.
If a 1 does not fall in position 1 or a 2 does not fall in position 2, the knowledge of event A will not give us any useful information. So, the expectation should not differ from the general cases:
Together, the expectation of Case 1 is:
-Case2: j = 1, 2 We need to discuss the value of position 1 and 2 first. The detail process is given in the following figure. The notation Hyper(N, K, n, even/odd) represents the summation of hyper-geometric distribution with parameters [N, K, n] and all even/odd k. This process will give us the expectation under case2 is:
From above analysis and my linear model,
give us an estimate of the slope around the expectation.
From Error to ErrGen
This case is more complex than the erroneous case. We want to calculate E[Counter(c i )|c i = 0]. However, in my analysis, all erroneous bits appear in the first half part. But during decoding, decoder may flip bits in the second half part of codewords. Luckily, bits in the second half part reacts similarly compared to bits in the first half so that we can apply our analysis of the first half part directly to the second half. The detailed proof is in Appendix C.
Without any information Without any information on the secrete key and error pattern, we can only regard them as uniformly random vectors each with weight 0 and t. The indicator event 1 j i under this case is equivalent to that randomly chooses 0 − 1 from k − t − 1 zeros and t ones without replacement, and gets odd number of ones, which follows a hyper-geometric distribution.
Event A: spectrum of error and spectrum of h 0 share a distance d I assume the distance between position 1 and position 2 is d and {a i , i = 1, , t} be the index of each bit node that equals one, arranging from smallest to largest, where a 2 − a 1 = d.
-Case1: j = 1 and j = 2: if j = 1, the position 2 cannot fall to a 2 and thus has less probability to be 1. We need discuss the value of position 2 first. If position 2 connected to 1 with probability t−1 k−2 : The rest will be identical to the hyper-geometric distribution that draws 0 − 2 from t − 1 ones and k − t − 1 zeros and sums about even ones. If position 2 connected to 0 with probability k−t−1 k−2 :The rest will be identical to the hyper-geometric distribution that draws 0 − 2 from t ones and k − t − 2 zeros and sums about odd ones. Consequently, the expectation under case 1 is:
-Case2: j = 1, 2:We need to discuss the choice of position 1 and 2 first. I use a figure to show my calculation. The Hyper(N, K, n, k),odd/even means a hyper-geometric distribution of choosing n samples with k successes from N − size population with K successful states in population, and calculate the sum of the probability of odd/even k. Finally, the expectation under Case2 will be:
-Final Expectation of Score under Event A: Case1 applied to j = 1 or j = 2, and Case2 applied to all other ω 0 − 2 choices of j.
Thus:
Similarly, we assume a linear model between Score 0 and θ. By the same analysis of Event A, we could get:
From the first layer to the performance of decoding
In LDPC decoding, the first layer plays a crucial role in the whole decoding process. In fact, most errors are corrected in the first three layers. To QC-MDPC code, the quasi-cyclic property ensures the symmetry among each bit. Therefore, it would be sufficient to quantify the performance of the first layer by two parameters: ErrCrt and ErrGen.
In most successful decoding, the first layer corrects a considerable amount of errors and generate very few errors. In the 90-bits security scheme, our default decoder can generally correct about 20.463 errors and cause 2.462 new errors by the default decoder.
However, the performance of decoding is not simply mostly related to ErrCrt-ErrGen, which is the net errors left after the first layer.
To timing attack, we measure the number of iterations during decoding. The Iterations has the largest correlation to ErrCrt − 1.6ErrGen. Thats to say, generating fewer new errors is more important than correcting existing errors in reducing decoding time.
Fig. 5. Correlation between timing attack and different combination of ErrCrt and ErrGen
A reasonable explanation for this relationship is that the error generating rate of the first layer is positively and closely related to the error generating rate of the following layers. In successful decoding, the new errors need two layers to complete a whole circle: one layer to generate, and one layer to eliminate. This assumption helps explain the near 1:2 ratio of Error Correction and Error Generation. Therefore, we could utilize this linear relationship to explain the timing attack.
An explanation to the timing attack algorithm
From above analysis, we get δ = t max ErrCrt − (1 − t max )ErrGen maximizing the correlation between δ and iterations during decoding. Then, we assume a linear model between δ and iterations:
δ, in a sense, represents the error-correcting ability of the first layer. Thus, it is believed to have a positive β. Since ErrCrt and ErrGen are linearly related to θ, Iteration is also linearly related to θ.
So, this β is negative since the relationship between θ and δ is negative. During the timing attack, attackers have access to the spectrum of error, ∆(e), and iterations to decode this error. Assuming that we are attacking the first position of secrete key ∆(h 0 ) 1 . Recall the definition of θ.
In the timing attack algorithm on distance 1, the program will record the number of errors whose first distance is not zeros. Mathematically, the program will return:
The 1 ∆(ei)1 is the indicator function of ∆(e i ) 1 , the first term in the distance spectrum of the i-th error.
Also, the program will sum up the number of iterations in decoding errors which has a nonzero first term in their distance spectrum. In math, this quantity is:
We evaluate the first term when M axT urn − → ∞:
When M axT urn − → ∞, we expect M axT urn i=1 1 ∆(ei)1 − → ∞. Therefore, by our assumption of independence among ∆(e) j , we can evaluate the second term to:
The rest two terms will also converge to:
Together, the program output is:
Also, the relationship among ∆(h 0 ) is:
Therefore, the program output will cluster into several levels which totally depends on the ∆(h 0 ) 1 and the gap is:
Appendix B: Experiment results for section 3.1
We do experiments on 90-bit security crypto-system scheme with decoder threshold [30,28,26,25,23,23,23,23,23,23,23,23,23,23,23,23,23]. A random secret key [h 0 , h 1 ] with 0 = 1 is generated and 50000 errors are tested on this key. In 90-bit security system, the estimate slope β 1 is:−0.001153. Fig. 6 . a plot of theta vs Score1 based on 50000 trials on a 90-bit system and a predetermined decoder. The red line is the regression line.
We can see the actual slope given by this experiment is −0.001159. This value is very close to our estimate value.
The first layer will correct an error if it has a counter value larger than (equal to) the threshold, which is 30 in this case. The counter value of an erroneous bit does not has a notable distribution. However, since the threshold is close to its expectation, the relation between the expectation and the error correction in first layer is relatively strong. Fig. 7 . a plot of Score1 vs ErrCrt based on 50000 trials on a 90-bit system and a pre-determined decoder. An obvious linear relation can be observed.
Appendix C: Applying the result in section 3.2 to second half part of the codeword All bits in the second half part are errorless, thus has no influence on the parity nodes. Also, we have no information on the secret key h 1 . Thus, bits in the second half part is randomly connected to ω 1 parity nodes. All parity nodes are symmetric thus has a same probability to be unsatisfied (but not necessarily independent). Then, E second [Score 0 ] = ω 1 P r(s = 1) = ω 1 wt(s) k (20) every unsatisfied parity node will increase the total score in the first half by exactly ω 0 . So:
The crypto-system requires k − t >> t:
A good QC-MDPC crypto-system will require ω 0 ≈ ω 1 . Otherwise, the decoder of this QC-MDPC code will be inefficient. Therefore,
The conclusion on E f irst [Score 0 ] can be applied to E[Score 0 ].
New errors are generated in first layer if the score of an errorless bit exceeds the threshold of the decoder, which is 30 in our test. It is obvious that an decrease in the expectation of score will result in a decrease in the false flip, ErrGen. 
